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A Better Way for 
Government to Save
Increasing national saving requires everyone to pitch in, including 
the government. Traditionally, policies to boost public saving have 
focused on either raising taxes or cutting spending—or both. However, 
in Latin America and the Caribbean today, that two-pronged strategy 
is largely a nonstarter. Plummeting commodity prices, rising interest 
rates, and a prolonged global recession have translated into deterio-
rating fiscal and external accounts and low, or no, growth for much of 
the region. To ask people and firms to contribute more in taxes and 
receive less in public services would be salt in the wounds of these 
ailing economies. There are, however, other ways for government to 
save. Essentially, the idea is for government to spend better in order 
to save more.
Governments, like individuals, save by postponing consumption. 
Public saving is the part of national saving that is under the direct con-
trol of governments. The contribution of public saving to total saving 
varies by country and by region. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the public sector contributes about 15 percent to total national sav-
ing—approximately 3 percentage points of GDP—on average. This is 
roughly midway between Emerging Asia, where public saving is about 
23 percent of national saving (8 percent of GDP), and Advanced Econo-
mies, where public saving is approximately 7 percent of national saving 
(1.5 percent of GDP) (see Chapter 2).
Public saving is total government revenue minus its consumption. 
Importantly, not all government spending is consumption. Govern-
ment expenditures can be divided into current expenditures and 
capital expenditures. Current expenditures include the wage bill of 
public employees, current transfers made by the government (for 




spending to provide public services such as education, health, and 
security. Current expenditures are government consumption. Instead, 
capital expenditures (public investment) are the real resources that 
governments use to build up the stock of capital in a country: for 
example, investments in infrastructure. Capital expenditures are part 
of a country’s investment, rather than a country’s consumption. There-
fore, they are part of public saving (government revenue that is not 
used for current consumption).
Increasing public saving in the region is necessary to strengthen 
fiscal sustainability and to support long-term growth. Lower growth in 
industrial countries and falling commodity prices have dealt a blow to 
economic performance in the region, causing structural fiscal deficits to 
rise since 2009. In many countries, public saving must be increased to 
guarantee fiscal solvency.
There are three ways of generating public saving: by increasing gov-
ernment revenue, by reducing current expenditures, or by increasing 
capital expenditures. When it comes to increasing government revenue, 
the policy options are limited, especially in Latin America and the Carib-
bean. Governments everywhere derive most of their revenue from taxes. 
In Latin America, raising taxes to increase public saving is not an easy 
option in many countries, either because tax pressure is already high or 
because many countries have already undertaken tax reforms, making it 
politically difficult to increase taxes.1
In addition to the practical difficulties of raising taxes, tax policies 
can have significant implications for saving that go beyond increasing 
government revenue (see Box 8.1). In particular, taxes can distort pri-
vate saving incentives. Thus, while they may add to government coffers, 
they may have little effect on total saving if they depress household and 
firm saving. The guiding principle for tax policy as it relates to saving is 
to design a tax system that avoids harming the saving incentives of indi-
viduals and firms, which are the largest sources of saving in the economy 
(see Chapter 1).
Actions to control government spending offer more space to 
increase public saving. Of course, cutting expenditures is not easy or 
popular in most contexts. However, this chapter focuses on two pow-
erful levers that governments have at their disposal to increase public 
saving without necessarily cutting expenditures across the board. The 
first is to switch expenditures from current to capital expenditures. The 
second is to increase the efficiency of current spending.
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BOX 8.1. THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON SAVING
Taxes have a direct negative impact on private saving because they reduce 
the disposable income of households and firms that pay taxes. At the same 
time, taxes have a direct positive impact on public saving because they are 
the main source of government revenue. Compared to other regions, Latin 
America and the Caribbean has a relatively high average tax burden on com-
plying taxpayers, but relatively low average tax revenue (as a share of GDP).a 
This is the worst possible combination for saving: a tax system that imposes 
very high tax rates (thereby distorting private saving decisions) and collects 
very little revenue (thereby adding little to public revenues and potentially not 
adding to public saving). This anomaly is compounded by the types of taxes 
paid and who pays those taxes in the region.
Taxes affect private saving decisions and the composition of savings through 
a variety of channels. Income taxes discourage private saving by taxing both 
the income from which saving is derived, as well as the return to accumulated 
savings (interest and dividends). By contrast, indirect taxes (for example, the 
value-Added-Tax) are less damaging to personal saving because they do not dis-
tort the rate of return to saving—provided tax rates remain constant over time.
The Latin American and Caribbean region derives a higher share of its tax 
revenue from “saving friendly” indirect taxes than from “saving foe” direct 
taxes on income. The contribution of indirect taxes to total revenues in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (46 percent of total revenue) and Emerging Asia 
(49 percent of total revenue) is higher than in Advanced Economies (35.5 per-
cent of total revenue). The contribution of pure direct taxes in Latin America 
(29 percent of revenue) is lower than in both Emerging Asia and Advanced 
Economies (39 and 37 percent of total revenue, respectively) (Figure B8.1).
However, in practice who pays income taxes, and hence the structure of 
direct taxes, matters for saving. On this aspect, Latin America penalizes sav-
ing more than other regions. Latin America and the Caribbean and Emerging 
Asia derive a relatively high share of revenues from corporate income taxes 
(CIT) rather than from personal income taxes (PIT) (Figure B8.2). The high-
er reliance on corporate income taxes penalizes saving. Firms generate the 
largest share of private saving in the economy (see Chapter 2); thus, taxing 
firms’ profits is taxing the main source of savings directly. There is more robust 
empirical evidence that changes in corporate taxes affect business saving 
than there is that personal income taxes hurt household saving.b In Chile, for 
example, reforms that lowered corporate income taxation in the mid-1980s 
triggered a 12 percentage point increase in private saving between 1985 and 
2012 (see Cerda et al., 2015).
(continued on next page)
a The “average” country hides diversity among countries. Some countries, such as Guatemala 
and Mexico, have a low tax effort, while others, like Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have a high 
tax effort close to Advanced Economies.
b See Callen and Thimann (1997); Djankov et al. (2010); Corbacho, Fretes Cibils, and Lora 
(2013); Cerda et al. (2015).
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Moreover, CIT tax rates in Latin America and the Caribbean (at about 26 
percent) are higher than in Emerging Asia (21 percent) and Advanced Econo-
mies (about 24 percent). However, CIT tax revenue, as a share of GDP, is lower 
in Latin America than in the other two regions (Figure B8.2). This reflects high 
tax evasion (high informality and weak enforcement) and a smaller tax base 
(more tax exemptions and large tax expenditures) in Latin America compared 
to other regions.c The combination of high CIT tax rates, with high evasion and 
a small tax base, results in a higher tax burden for tax compliers. Therefore, the 
effective corporate tax rate in Latin America and the Caribbean (18.3 percent 
of profits) is higher than in both Emerging Asia (14.1 percent) and Advanced 
Economies (15.5 percent) (World Bank and PwC, 2015). When considering all 
taxes on profits (turnover taxes, financial transaction taxes, and payroll taxes 
on employers), the burden of taxation for a typical formal firm in Latin Amer-
ica reaches about 51 percent of profits, compared to 28 percent in Emerging 
Asia and about 41 percent in Advanced Economies.d
Hence, while the ratio of revenue derived from direct taxes to GDP in Latin 
America is low by international standards, effective rates for compliers are 
BOX 8.1. (continued)
Figure B8.1  Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP by Indirect, Direct and Other 
Direct Taxes, 2012




























Source: IDB-CIAT Tax Database and WEO, IMF.
Note: Other direct taxes includes payroll taxes, trade taxes, property taxes and financial trans-
actions taxes.
c Tax expenditures from the corporate income tax amount to about 0.9 percent of GDP on 
average, more than one-quarter of actual corporate tax collection, but they have been quite 
ineffective in incentivizing investment. Tax evasion on average, amounts to about 52 percent 
of potential tax collection in Latin America. (Corbacho, Fretes Cibils, and Lora, 2013).
d This effective tax rate is for one type of firm described in the Doing Business database 
(World Bank and PwC, 2015).
A BETTER WAY FOR GOvERNMENT TO SAvE 191
high. This has significant negative implications for private saving for two rea-
sons. First, the relatively high tax burden on compliers (formal firms) reduces 
their saving capacity. Second, the tax structure that penalizes formal firms 
encourages informality (as firms try to evade high tax burdens) and thereby 
distorts the efficient allocation of economic resources, lowers productivity 
growth, and reduces the returns to saving and investment.e
Finally, tax systems can affect not only how much people and firms save, 
but also how they save. The structure of incentives embedded in tax systems 
across the region generates distortions. For example, the effective capital 
gains tax rate on housing is 23.3 percent in Emerging Asia, 17.9 percent in 
Advanced Economies, and only 12.2 percent in Latin America.f And while most 
Latin American countries tax dividends and financial returns (interest), they 
do not tax the imputed rents of owner-occupied housing. Hence, financial 
savings end up paying the highest effective tax rate.g This may discourage 
financial savings in favor of alternative saving vehicles such as housing—there-
by reinforcing other distortions that increase the already high propensity of 
some people in Latin American and the Caribbean to save through housing, to 
the detriment of financial saving instruments.h
Figure B8.2  Income Tax Revenue by Corporate Income Tax and Personal 
Income Tax, 2012

























Source: IDB-CIAT Tax database and IMF (2015).
e See Pagés (2010).
f Authors’ elaboration on the basis of Global Property Guide Research, Contributing Account-
ing Firms. http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/faq/guide-taxes.
g See IMF (2009).
h See Cruces (2016) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2012).
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Current vs. Capital Expenditures: Fix the Mix
Starting from very low levels, Latin America slowly but surely increased 
public savings from as little as 1 percent of GDP in 1989 to almost 6 per-
cent of GDP in 2007 as policymakers recognized the urgent need for 
fiscal consolidation (see Figure 8.1). Since 2009, public saving has been 
on a declining path, reaching 2.8 percent of GDP in 2014.
Total government expenditure from 2007 to 2014 jumped 3.7 per-
centage points of GDP. More than 90 percent of that increase went into 
current expenditure, and only 8 percent was devoted to public invest-
ment (Figure 8.2). Thus, public investment—a fundamental component 
of public saving—was the big loser in terms of expenditure allocation.2
As a consequence of these policies, public investment in the region 
has paled in comparison to other emerging markets such as Emerging 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Economic Outlook database (IMF, 2015).
Figure 8.2  Composition of Average Increase in Primary Public Spending, 
2007–14 (percentage of GDP)
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on national budget data.
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Asia. Despite a slight uptick in public investment as a share of GDP in 
the 2000s, public investment in Latin America and the Caribbean rep-
resents only 60 percent of the level of public investment in Emerging 
Asian economies (Figure 8.3).
Public investment is not only relatively low, but its share in total gov-
ernment expenditure has been declining. Figure 8.4 shows the evolution 
of current expenditure vis-à-vis capital expenditure from 1995 to 2014. 
Current expenditure has climbed steadily, while capital expenditure 
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Figure 8.4  Evolution of Current and Capital Expenditure, Latin America and 
the Caribbean Average 
















Source: Authors’ calculations based on national budget data.
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has had its ups and downs, increasing sharply from 2004 to 2008, but 
leveling off thereafter. While current expenditure has almost tripled 
throughout this period, capital expenditure has only doubled. As a result, 
public investment decreased to only 17 percent of primary government 
expenditure by 2014, down from almost 23 percent in 1995. Fiscal belt 
tightening in the region in 2015 and 2016 as a result of worsening exter-
nal conditions has accentuated the trend as several governments chose 
to cut back on capital expenditures (saving) instead of current expendi-
tures (consumption).3
Several factors may account for the low level of investment com-
pared to current spending in Latin America and the Caribbean. First, 
many countries may have mistakenly viewed the favorable external fac-
tors of the early 2000s as permanent, and thus channeled a larger share 
of windfall revenues to consumption (by increasing current expendi-
tures) than to saving.
But low investment levels may also reflect a political economy prob-
lem. Using a probabilistic voting model, Izquierdo and Kawamura (2015) 
show that, to the extent that current generations (the “old,” in their 
model) have more voting power than future generations (or the “young”), 
then current spending may prevail over public investment, even if low 
investment hurts long-term growth. The stronger the electoral power 
of the old, the weaker will be the incentives for public investment, in 
favor of generous current-period spending (transfers). In other words, 
since future generations do not vote today on their preferred spending 
allocation, current generations that need resources now—or do not give 
priority to the needs of their offspring—may shift expenditure allocation 
away from capital expenditure.4 This description reflects the situation in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, where surveys show that people do 
not save enough for retirement because they expect somebody else (or 
the government) to provide for their retirement needs (see Chapter 6).
Another reason for the bias toward current expenditure over invest-
ment lies in government’s response to the economic cycle. Best practice 
would suggest increasing capital expenditure in bad times and reducing 
it in good times: that is, using capital expenditure to spend counter-
cyclically. However, if governments must adjust their budgets in bad 
times—thereby precluding countercyclical policies and forcing expendi-
ture cuts—they may find it easier to cut public investment than salaries 
or transfers that might risk political turmoil. But once capital expendi-
ture has been reduced in a downturn, governments should remember to 
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increase public investment in good times. Typically, this has not been the 
case in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Ardánaz and Izquierdo (2016) evaluate the procyclicality of cur-
rent and capital expenditures in Latin America and test whether the 
two types of spending respond differently to changes in the business 
cycle.5 If real expenditure were to grow at a constant rate—say, the long-
term growth rate of real output—it should not be affected by cyclical 
fluctuations. However, the authors find that current and capital expendi-
tures react to the business cycle in different ways. Current expenditures 
grow in good times, but do not fall back in bad times. The opposite 
holds for real capital expenditures, which shrink in bad times, but do not 
rebound in good times. These estimated impacts and their relevance are 
described in Figure 8.5, panel a, which clearly illustrates this asymmet-
ric response. The implications are serious: current expenditures tend to 
increase as a share of total expenditure, confirming the bias in favor of 
current expenditure and against capital expenditure—and, by extension, 
against public saving.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on national budget data.
Note: Authors’ estimates based on Ardánaz and Izquierdo (2016). Ardánaz and Izquierdo run re-
gressions of the type ∆g = a + b*Positive Cycle + c*Negative Cycle + ε , where ∆g is the change in 
real expenditure, Positive Cycle is the value of the cyclical component of output when it is positive, 
and Negative Cycle is the value of the cyclical component when it is negative. The value reported 
on the y-axis is the estimated coefficient measuring expenditure sensitivity to cyclical component. 
Label y-axis: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Latin America contrasts starkly to Emerging Asia and Advanced 
Economies (Figure 8.5, panel b), where capital expenditures do not react 
negatively at all in bad times; if anything, East Asian countries expand 
their capital spending during trying times. Thus, the bias against capi-
tal spending is more marked in Latin America and the Caribbean than in 
other regions. Governments in the region should adjust their spending 
policies to remedy this bias. The key is to design and implement fiscal 
policy rules that reduce discretion in the allocation of public spend-
ing over the business cycle and help overcome the bias against capital 
expenditures that is currently built into spending behaviors. Mending 
the mix between current and capital expenditures can increase saving 
without affecting the overall level of spending.
Efficiency: A Path to Saving
Governments can also boost public saving by increasing capital expendi-
tures directly. In fact, increasing public investment enhances productivity 
in the private sector and, therefore, propels growth in the region (see 
Chapter 4). How can governments make room in their budgets to 
increase capital expenditures? One way is by switching expenditures, as 
described above. Another way is to borrow from abroad. However, this 
option is restricted, particularly in a less favorable external environment. 
Moreover, external borrowing carries its own set of risks (see Chapter 5). 
Another way is to adjust current expenditures.
Adjusting current expenditures can be a painful process; however, 
understanding their composition and identifying inefficiencies in pub-
lic expenditure can be very useful to reduce the burden. This process 
is known as “smart” adjustment. Instead of cutting expenditures across 
the board—as has been done many times in the past—it is better to dis-
sect the budget sector by sector and sort out inefficiencies. But how 
can inefficiencies be identified?
A key tool for reducing inefficiencies is appropriate targeting of cur-
rent expenditure. Typically, expenditures will target a particular group, 
be it energy subsidies for low-income families or social programs for the 
poor. However, in practice many recipients of these subsidies are not 
part of the targeted population. For example, an electricity subsidy for 
consumption on the first 150 KWh for the entire population in a country 
may very well reach low-income households that consume less than 150 
KWh, but will also subsidize higher-income households on those first 150 
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KWh. The receipt of the subsidy by the higher-income household would 
be considered leakage, and an inefficiency because people outside the 
target group are receiving the subsidy. Or consider an exemption on the 
value added tax on food, also called a tax expenditure. Typically, this 
measure aims to make food more affordable to low-income households. 
However, this tax expenditure also benefits higher-income households 
that should not be receiving the benefit and, thus, constitutes an ineffi-
ciency. Or think of a conditional cash transfer program focused on poor 
families: in many cases, beneficiaries of these programs may include 
families that are sufficiently well-off to finance whatever the transfer is 
supporting; in such case the transfer would be poorly targeted and a 
source of inefficiency.
A key element to define up front when identifying leakage is the 
population to be targeted. In this discussion, the targeted population 
is the poor, defined as those individuals whose income lies below the 
national poverty line.6
The leakage concept can be easily applied to sectors in the public 
budget that work with targeted populations, as is the case of electricity 
subsidies, social programs, or tax expenditures. However, two key areas 
of government expenditure that account for a significant portion of the 
budget—health and education—aim at universal coverage. For these 
areas of expenditure, leakage is not an issue. Therefore, defining ineffi-
ciency in those sectors is much more challenging.
For these sectors, benchmarking provides a means of determining 
inefficiency. Countries that are good at providing those services—that 
is, that achieve good results with the lowest amount of inputs—serve as 
benchmarks against which other countries can be compared.7 However, 
this approach inevitably raises caveats because other factors—many of 
them difficult to measure consistently—may affect the results.8
Inefficiencies in expenditure stem not only from input numbers (i.e. 
the number of teachers or doctors), but also from their cost. For exam-
ple, if for a given job qualification, wages are much higher in the public 
sector than the private sector, then there is room for improvement. Both 
the usage of inputs and wage differentials in the public and private sec-
tors provide indications of inefficiency in universal coverage sectors 
such as education and health.
The next section analyses five sectors for inefficiencies: energy, 
social programs, tax expenditures, education, and health. These five sec-
tors amount to roughly half of primary expenditure for the average Latin 
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American country. Admirably, the region has worked hard to boost wel-
fare by increasing the provision of these important services. However, 
the efficiency and targeting of these services is important if they are to 
realize their full potential.
Energy
In the case of energy subsidies for low-income families, governments 
often set prices at a level that does not cover operating costs. Bolivia’s 
Tarifa Dignidad and Brazil’s Tarifa Social Baixa Renda provide good exam-
ples. Using household expenditure surveys, it is possible to assess how 
many beneficiaries of the subsidy were initially targeted by the program. 
For instance, in the case of price subsidies to low-income households for 
the use of electricity below 150 KWh, any household consuming more 
than that amount, or whose income is above the poverty line, should not 
receive the subsidy. Figure 8.6, based on household survey micro data 
for a representative country, illustrates this point clearly: all points below 
the poverty line and to the left of the 150 KWh line are households that 
should be targeted by the subsidy policy. However, many households 
that are not poor, but that consume less than 150 KWh, receive the sub-
sidy. This group constitutes what is typically called “inclusion error,” or 
leakage. Aggregating subsidies provided to these households yields a 
measure of the leakage in electricity subsidies.
When policies are generalized so that all households receive a 
subsidy—such as fixing the retail price of gasoline below the cost of pro-
ducing it—then leakage can be estimated as the cost of this policy to 
the public institution covering the shortfall. However, the entire short-
fall does not constitute leakage, as part of it will reach poor households. 
Expenditure surveys can help estimate the share of a fuel subsidy (on 
gasoline, for example) that goes to households above the poverty line. 
The size of the leakage is the product of this share and the total amount 
of the shortfall spent by the government agency.9 A similar approach 
can be applied to other energy subsidies, including those for fuel oil, nat-
ural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas.10
Table 8.1 shows government subsidies to the energy sector in each 
of 18 Latin American countries with available information as of 2013 (no 
data is available for venezuela, which is the largest energy producer in 
the region and offers large subsidies to domestic consumption of gas-
oline). Although they vary widely across countries, on average, energy 
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subsidies eat up close to 1 percent of GDP, ranging from countries with 
high subsidies, such as Bolivia (3.3 percent of GDP) and Argentina (2.1 
percent of GDP), to countries with no subsidies, such as Chile and Peru. 
The point is that more than two-thirds of these subsidies leak out to 
nonpoor households that are not part of the targeted population. The 
magnitude of this inefficiency—and therefore the margin for improve-
ment—is huge.
Figure 8.6  Example of Leakage (Inclusion Error) in Electricity Subsidies in 
Nicaragua
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Izquierdo, Loo-Kung, and Navajas (2013).
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This analysis was carried out with information up to year-end 2013. 
With energy prices plummeting (and the structure of subsidies largely 
unchanged), the size of subsidies across the different energy subsec-
tors (gasoline, fuel oil, natural gas, and liquefied petroleum gas) may 
be lower. The sensitivity of prices in these subsectors with respect to 
international oil prices varies country by country, and may or may not 
be large depending on the specific case. The price of oil has fallen by as 
much as 50 percent on average between 2013 and 2015; thus, the total 
cost of leakage may have declined. However, this decline does not make 
waste in energy subsidies any less important: since energy prices may 














Bolivia 3.29 0.91 2.37 0.76 1.92 2.68
Argentina 2.06 0.85 1.21 0.79 1.15 1.94
Honduras 1.85 0.90 0.95 0.55 0.71 1.25
El Salvador 1.75 1.39 0.36 0.91 0.30 1.21
Domican Republic 1.38 0.65 0.73 0.43 0.62 1.05
Mexico 1.29 0.53 0.77 0.33 0.49 0.82
Nicaragua 1.11 0.86 0.25 0.60 0.21 0.81
Panama 0.81 0.51 0.30 0.47 0.30 0.77
Brazil 0.80 0.24 0.56 0.21 0.50 0.71
Colombia 0.37 0.27 0.10 0.19 0.08 0.27
Guatemala 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.22
Uruguay 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.11
Paraguay 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04
Peru 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belize 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Costa Rica 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jamaica 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average 0.85 0.42 0.43 0.31 0.35 0.66
Source: FIEL and IDB based on official fiscal, energy, and household survey data.
a Leakages to non-poor households.
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go up again, leakage is likely to catch up with previous levels if the cur-
rent subsidy structure remains intact.
Social Programs
Expenditures on social programs, defined as spending to guarantee a 
basic level of economic and social welfare, can be analyzed in a sim-
ilar way. Unlike contributory pension payments, transfers for social 
programs do not require individuals to contribute anything to receive 
benefits (hence, these transfers are “noncontributory”). The target pop-
ulation typically consists of individuals, families, communities, or groups 
that are considered vulnerable and require special attention, such as the 
poor, children, or the elderly.11
The two main social program expenditures are conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) and noncontributory pensions (NCPs). Both are con-
sidered monetary transfer programs. The major objective of CCTs is 
to reduce the intergenerational transmission of poverty by investing in 
human capital. They provide transfers to families with children below 
18 years of age and/or pregnant women—usually on a monthly basis—
subject to their compliance with particular requirements, such as school 
enrollment and health checkups. These programs, pioneered in the early 
1990s by Progresa in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil, have become 
popular throughout Latin America.
Noncontributory pensions are a more recent phenomenon that 
has grown significantly in several Latin American countries since 2000 
to deal with the many individuals who reach retirement age without 
enough formal contributions to any pension system (see Chapter 7). 
This situation weighs heavily in the decisions of younger individuals to 
participate in formal labor markets and save long term, because non-
contributory pensions can provide incentives for informality and may 
lower saving. This chapter will examine only the targeting aspect of 
NCPs.
Table 8.2 shows the evolution of social program expenditures from 
2003 to 2013. Spending increased continuously in most countries and in 
some countries, it more than tripled. Overall, this trend has been a posi-
tive development because it has helped reduce poverty and inequality in 
the region.
However, not all spending on social programs has been prop-
erly targeted to the poor. Table 8.3 shows the estimated leakage for 
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monetary transfer programs—conditional cash transfers and noncon-
tributory pensions—as well as other social programs as a share of GDP. 
Although on average they represent only one-half of 1 percent of GDP, 
countries vary substantially. Leakage tends to be smaller in Central 
American countries, averaging 0.3 percent of GDP. For these countries, 
social spending is lower and populations are relatively poorer, leaving 
less margin for error. However, leakage is much higher for South Amer-
ican countries, averaging 0.8 percent of GDP. Once again, the striking 
feature about expenditures on social programs is how high leakage is 
as a share of total expenditures: 45 percent, on average, for the region 
(52 percent in South American countries, and 35 percent in Central 
America). Although leakage is high, its share of total subsidies is not as 
high as in other sectors, such as energy or tax expenditures, which lack 
a clear targeting strategy and are, therefore, more prone to leakage.
Table 8.2 Social Programs Expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Country 2003–06 2007–10 2011–13
Argentina 1.1 2.3 3.6
Paraguay 0.1 1.1 1.9
Uruguay 0.9 1.8 1.7
Bolivia 1.3 1.6 1.6
Costa Rica 0.9 1.1 1.4
Brazil 0.8 1.0 1.2
Honduras 0.6 0.9 1.1
Chile 0.5 0.7 1.1
Belize n.a. n.a. 1.0
Colombia 0.7 0.9 1.0
El Salvador 0.4 0.5 0.8
Guatemala 0.5 0.7 0.7
Dominican Republic 1.3 1.1 0.7
Mexico 0.3 0.7 0.7
Nicaragua 0.9 0.7 0.6
Jamaica 0.3 0.5 0.5
Panama 0.0 0.2 0.5
Peru 0.6 0.5 0.5
Average 0.7 1.0 1.1
Source: FIEL and IDB based on national budget data.
n.a. = Data not available.
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Tax Expenditures
Instead of transferring resources directly to needy households through 
budgetary spending, governments often offer tax relief, and thus 
transfer resources indirectly through tax exemptions. With the aim of 
protecting the poor, many goods and services that weigh heavily in 
the consumption basket of the poor—including foodstuffs, medicines, 
and rents—are exempted from taxes. This policy is one of the most 
prone to leakage, as most of the foregone tax collection goes to bet-
ter-off individuals, who typically spend more in the aggregate than do 
the poor.
The value added tax (vAT) is the main tax used for this purpose. 
Most countries in Latin America offer either vAT reductions or exemp-
tions for food, medicine, and rent, irrespective of income. Most countries 








Leakages as percentage of 
social program expenditures
Argentina 1.9 0.1 2.0 56.2
Paraguay 0.2 0.9 1.1 58.2
Uruguay 0.7 0.4 1.1 62.4
Bolivia 0.7 0.1 0.8 50.9
Chile 0.6 0.1 0.7 65.2
Brazil 0.4 0.2 0.6 51.8
Costa Rica 0.3 0.3 0.6 42.1
Colombia 0.1 0.4 0.5 50.6
Belize 0.0 0.4 0.4 39.0
El Salvador 0.1 0.3 0.4 46.3
Jamaica 0.2 0.2 0.4 66.6
Dominican Republic 0.1 0.2 0.3 44.3
Panama 0.2 0.1 0.2 48.0
Mexico 0.1 0.1 0.2 28.9
Nicaragua 0.0 0.2 0.2 31.7
Guatemala 0.1 0.1 0.2 24.3
Peru 0.1 0.0 0.2 35.1
Honduras 0.1 0.0 0.1 8.2
Average 0.3 0.2 0.6 45.0
Source: FIEL and IDB based on household surveys and national budget data.
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also produce estimates of tax expenditures, which serve as a bench-
mark to calculate leakage.12 Household surveys and specific studies on 
tax expenditures in the region are then used to estimate how much the 
nonpoor consume in food, medicine, and rent. These two pieces of infor-
mation allow for estimating the leakage in tax expenditures.13
On average, total tax expenditures amount to 2.3 percent of GDP 
(see Table 8.4). Of this total, tax spending on food, medicine, and hous-
ing account for almost 1 percent of GDP. Nearly three-quarters of tax 
expenditure on these items benefits nonpoor households: equivalent to 
0.73 percent of GDP. In some countries, leakage is as high as 1.8 percent 
of GDP. Overall, tax expenditures are probably the most regressive item 
in the subsidy agenda.
Table 8.4  Tax Expenditure in VAT on Food, Medicine and Housing, and 




Tax expenditure on food, 
medicine, and housing Leakage
Leakage (share of 
tax expenditure)
Nicaragua 4.5 2.3 1.8 75.3
Dominican Republic 3.2 2.2 1.5 65.6
Costa Rica 3.4 2.0 1.8 87.2
Colombia 4.9 1.3 1.1 84.6
Mexico 1.5 1.2 0.6 52.7
Uruguay 2.2 1.1 0.9 82.5
Panama 2.3 0.8 0.7 81.2
Guatemala 1.4 0.8 0.4 52.0
Jamaica 3.5 0.8 0.7 88.8
Brazil 3.0 0.7 0.6 91.7
Peru 1.3 0.4 0.4 85.2
Argentina 1.0 0.4 0.4 90.1
El Salvador 1.0 0.5 0.3 65.3
Chile 0.8 0.2 0.2 78.3
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.a.
Belize n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras 3.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Paraguay n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Average 2.3 1.0 0.7 77.2
Source: FIEL and IDB estimates based on national data and other studies.
n.a. = Data not available.
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Education and Health
Estimating spending inefficiencies in areas that offer universal cover-
age such as health and education call for a different methodology and 
raises several questions. For example, should the focus be on searching 
for best practice countries that provide the best possible education with 
the lowest number of teachers per student? Or should inefficiencies be 
estimated in relation to each country’s success in achieving the desired 
results for the sector? The latter may be more appealing, but requires 
an in-depth knowledge at the country level about the particular strat-
egy for the sector—and even then, the strategy may be loosely defined 
in many countries, or may not be ambitious enough. Moreover, coun-
try comparisons may be very difficult. For these reasons, this analysis 
uses the first approach, in which all countries are compared against a 
benchmark considered the best performer in each sector. Of course, this 
methodology has its own drawbacks. It assumes that the technology 
used by the best performer is replicable by other countries—an issue up 
for debate among practitioners in this area.
The first step is to identify a benchmark country. A tool often used 
to obtain this benchmark is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which 
assumes a production frontier based on cross-country data on inputs 
and their corresponding outputs.14 With this frontier as reference, the 
country that produces the best results with the lowest amount of asso-
ciated input is identified.
The discussion that follows assumes that workers in the sector—
whether teachers in the education sector or doctors and nurses in the 
health sector—are the main production factor generating the results in 
that sector: say, test scores in education or life expectancy in health. Of 
course, other factors may affect results, such as diet or smoking, in the 
case of health. However, studies in health care, for example, indicate that 
expenditure in the sector is a main factor driving results in terms of life 
expectancy.15 Since the wage bill comprises the largest share of expen-
diture, the analysis will focus on both components of the wage bill—the 
number of workers and wages—to identify inefficiencies.
Despite the support provided by DEA studies to follow this route, the 
inefficiency analyses below represent only a first pass at the extremely 
difficult exercise of capturing inefficiencies in sectors with universal cov-
erage. A full analysis should control for other idiosyncratic factors that 
affect outcome variables which, given the scope of this study and data 
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availability restrictions, will not be taken into account. However, these 
caveats do not make the analysis any less relevant: to date, no com-
parative analysis of inefficiencies in these sectors is available for Latin 
American countries. Estimations below should be useful to start a discus-
sion about efficiency management in two important sectors, including 
the production of additional performance and quality indicators to allow 
a more detailed estimate of outstanding inefficiencies.
Education
International benchmarks are often used in education. A common 
benchmark is PISA (the Program for International Student Assessment), 
a triennial international survey that aims to evaluate education systems 
worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students. 
Figure 8.7 shows the secondary-students-per-teacher ratio contrasted 
against average PISA scores for a group of OECD countries.16
In this high performing group of countries, the Republic of Korea 
stands out as the country with the highest score for one of the lowest 
input (teachers). With Korea as the benchmark country, student to teacher 
ratios, at both the primary and secondary school level, are contrasted with 
those of Latin American countries with available data to determine a road-
map for improving the efficiency of spending on education. In the typical 
Figure 8.7  Average Math, Reading, and Science PISA Performance vs. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on OECD.
Note: PISA = Programme for international student assessment.
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case, this entails reducing the number of teachers while investing heavily 
in teacher training to reach OECD standards: a major undertaking.17
The second factor affecting efficiency in this sector is the teacher 
wage bill. This is a thorny issue since salaries should reflect productivity, 
which is difficult to measure. A shortcut is to compare teacher wages in 
public schools against those in private schools to determine their com-
petitiveness. Another option is to fit a curve depicting the relationship 
between public teacher wages relative to per capita GDP in that coun-
try against GDP per capita levels. Large deviations from this relationship 
can be viewed as evidence of excessive pay (when above the curve) or 
insufficient pay (when below the curve). Figure 8.8 displays the behavior 
of this relationship for a group of OECD and Latin American countries. 
Countries well above fitted values (outliers) indicate countries where 
savings could be achieved.
Considering both the worker and wage tools defined above provides 
an approximation to assess the current wage bill against a hypothetical 
efficient wage bill. The efficient wage bill covers a workforce of teachers 
consistent with the students per teacher ratios defined by the bench-
mark, and wages that fall within acceptable levels of the wage to GDP 
per capita ratio. Differences between the current wage bill and the 
efficient wage bill are considered a proxy for inefficiency, and thus an 
indication of potential savings in expenditures of the sector.18
This analysis is based on data for 13 countries in the region: Belize, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
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Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. Within 
this group, the average savings from bringing the wage bill in educa-
tion down to efficient levels amount to 0.7 percent of GDP. However, 
countries vary considerably. Most of these savings stem from wage 
differentials rather than inefficiencies in student per teacher ratios. 
The numbers are only indicative, given the caveats of the method-
ologies used to generate them, and the importance of preserving 
incentives to attract qualified teachers and reward performance. Nev-
ertheless, the discrepancies point to the need to evaluate the wage 
bill in education.
Health
The health sector is assessed in a similar fashion. Figure 8.9 shows the 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the associated frontier obtained 
by comparing life expectancy against the number of health profession-
als employed by the sector. The efficiency frontier is shown by countries 
that have a red data point. Most countries in the upper part of the frontier 
have a life expectancy in the neighborhood of 80 years. However, many 
more health professionals are needed to obtain only marginal increases 
in life expectancy beyond 80 years. Studies by the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) recommend a figure of 22.8 health staff (doctors and 
nurses) per 10,000 inhabitants for public sector systems (WHO, 2006). 
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This level is in line with the lowest number of health professionals asso-
ciated with a life expectancy around 80 years of age shown in the 
efficiency frontier of Figure 8.9. Thus, the WHO figure was taken as the 
benchmark for the number of workers.
Regarding salaries, the same approach used in education is fol-
lowed. Figures 8.10 panels a and b show the relationship between wages 
relative to GDP per capita in a country against GDP per capita levels for 
both physicians and nurses. Fitted values are used as a benchmark to 
contrast existing wages to determine wage savings.
Putting both worker and wage components together helps deter-
mine the efficient wage bill proxy, which can be compared against the 
actual wage bill to determine total potential savings in the health sector 
for each Latin American country. The same countries were used in this 
analysis as in the analysis for education, except for Belize, for which no 
data were available. Potential savings are smaller than in other sectors, 
averaging 0.2 percent of GDP. In some countries, however, the savings 
could be as large as 0.9 percent of GDP.
It All Adds Up
The numbers speak for themselves. Smart adjustments can yield big 
payoffs. In the targeted areas of energy, social programs, and tax 
expenditures, overall savings could amount to up to 2 percent of GDP 
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for the average country—and as high as 4.3 percent of GDP in the most 
acute cases. Figure 8.11 shows total savings in targeted sectors and 
their breakdown by sector for the 18 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries in the sample. Not surprisingly, leakage is somewhat less in 
social programs than in energy and tax expenditure, since social pro-
grams are targeted by design and thus should be less prone to leakage. 
Thus, savings from leakage in energy and tax expenditures may be 
larger and easier to fix when choosing among saving opportunities. 
The challenge for governments is that eliminating leakage will have to 
be done in ways that do not leave the poor unprotected. This is not an 
easy task, as governments need to know who the poor are and where 
they live, and allocate transfers to them directly in order to switch from 
price subsidies (which are prone to leakage) to income transfers tar-
geted specifically to the poor.
Figure 8.12 presents a breakdown for select countries in the region on 
potential savings in education and health. Together, these inefficiencies 
average about 1 percent of GDP—but can be as large as 2.8 percent of 
GDP for some countries. Estimated inefficiencies average 0.7 percent of 
Figure 8.11  Potential Savings in Targeted Expenditure (Social Programs, 
Energy, and Tax Expenditure)
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on their own estimates.
Note: For comparability purposes, countries have been split into two groups. Group 1 contains 
estimates of leakages for countries with data on all three sectors, while Group 2 does not include 
estimates on tax expenditure leakages.
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GDP for education, and about 0.2 percent of GDP for health. Again, there 
is substantial variation across countries: inefficiencies can be as high as 
2.6 percent of GDP in education, and 0.9 percent of GDP in health.
Estimating inefficiencies in spending in sectors with universal cov-
erage is a very difficult task. A complete assessment would ideally 
control for all the factors that affect outcome variables, such as inter-
national assessment scores in education or life expectancy in health. 
However, given the scope of this study and the restrictions on data 
availability, only the wage bill was considered in each case, and here 
too care must be taken to assure efficiency without comprising incen-
tives that attract quality personnel to teaching and health care. The 
caveats are important but do not make the analysis any less relevant: 
this is the first comparative analysis of inefficiencies in these sectors 
for Latin American countries. These estimates are a useful proxy for 
potential savings in these sectors based on large personnel or wage 
deviations from selected benchmarks.
The estimates presented in this chapter are a useful starting point 
for a policy debate on improving the efficiency of both management and 
public spending in important sectors such as education and health. From 
here the discussion should be expanded to include additional perfor-
mance and quality indicators that will allow a more detailed assessment 
of existing inefficiencies.
Figure 8.12 Potential Savings in Education and Health
Percentage of GDP
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Note: Belize does not include estimates on health leakages.
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Reducing inefficiencies in the five sectors analyzed here could 
amount, on average, to potential savings in the neighborhood of 3 per-
cent of GDP. Particularly in economies that need to ensure fiscal solvency 
and make productive investments, these potential savings are significant 
indeed.
Saving, from the Top Down
Increasing public saving is no easy task, and doing so by raising taxes or 
slashing expenditures is not only politically unpopular but may be coun-
terproductive as well. For example, increasing taxes may discourage 
private saving, while across-the-board spending cuts may reduce much-
needed public investment and jeopardize the social progress of recent 
years. But governments do have other options. The first alternative is to 
correct the entrenched bias in public spending against capital expen-
ditures (which is saving) and in favor of current expenditures (which is 
consumption). various political economy and budgeting distortions pro-
duce this bias. Acknowledging them and building mechanisms into fiscal 
rules to overcome the bias can help boost public saving through expen-
diture switching rather than expenditure reduction.19
In addition, the government can save more by spending better. Pub-
lic saving rates in Latin America and the Caribbean are on average 5 
percentage points of GDP lower than in East Asia. The analysis in this 
chapter suggests that approximately half that gap can be overcome 
by targeting public expenditures better in areas like energy, social pro-
grams, and tax expenditures and by improving efficiency in health and 
education. Doing so requires analyzing leakages in the budget, dissect-
ing spending by sectors, and searching for potential efficiency gains.
Public saving is not the largest contributor to national saving; how-
ever, it is an important one. Governments that want to encourage more 
saving by the private sector should set the example by using the tools 
available to them. After two decades of fiscal reforms in Latin America 
and the Caribbean that have significantly improved fiscal sustainability 
across the region, it is time to delve into the budgetary reforms that can 
yield a permanent increase in public saving rates. Saving for develop-
ment is everyone’s responsibility, starting with the government.
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Notes
1 For a complete assessment of tax policy in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, see Corbacho, Fretes Cibils, and Lora (2013).
2 Roughly half of the increase was allocated to subsidies and transfers, 
and a quarter to wages and salaries. This points to larger inflexibili-
ties in government expenditure, as salaries, subsidies and transfers 
are much more difficult to reverse, if needed, relative to public 
investment.
3 The fact that public investment is low and current expenditure is gaining 
as a share of the budget also has pernicious implications for fiscal sus-
tainability, for at least two reasons. First, any needed adjustment will be 
increasingly difficult to implement, given the inflexible nature of much of 
current expenditure. Second, lower public investment may lead to lower 
growth, thus raising the bar of required primary surpluses in the future.
4 As societies age, this effect may become stronger.
5 Ardánaz and Izquierdo (2016) follow a framework similar to the one 
used by Balassone and Kumar (2007) to analyze the cyclicality of 
total public expenditure. They run separate regressions for changes 
in real current expenditure and changes in real capital expenditure 
against a constant and the cyclical component of output perfor-
mance. A key part of their analysis is that they estimate separate 
coefficients for the impact of the cyclical component of output, tak-
ing into account good times (periods when the cyclical component 
is positive) compared to bad times (periods when the cyclical com-
ponent is negative.
6 The level of individual income used to define the poor is net of any 
subsidy they may be receiving from the government. Another pop-
ular measure—consistent with several existing studies—is individuals 
ranked in the lowest 40 percent of the expenditure distribution.
7 Such is the case of Data Envelopment Analysis, a concept that will be 
used in this report.
8 For example, idiosyncratic factors may cause a population to assign 
more importance to education than other countries, as might be the 
case in some Asian countries.
9 The implicit assumption is that expenditure patterns captured in 
expenditure surveys do not misrepresent or overrepresent the expen-
diture of the poor relative to that of the nonpoor.
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10 Yet another case is that of subsidies to nonresidential clients in other 
sectors, which cover a wide range of consumers and firms. For those 
cases, shares in total consumption of individuals above the poverty 
line are used to determine leakage. This approach constitutes a lower 
bound, as only the share of the subsidy to nonresidential sectors that 
is consumed by the nonpoor is considered leakage. Alternatively, the 
entire subsidy could be considered a leakage. Even more detailed anal-
ysis could use the supply and utilization tables from national accounts 
data to identify the impact of subsidies on intermediate energy inputs 
at the sectoral level. However, this approach exceeds the scope of this 
analysis.
11 Although some health and education expenditure can be considered 
social assistance, they are not included in the category of social assis-
tance expenditure.
12 However, not all of them publish these estimates in a disaggregated 
form that allows identifying exemptions by type of tax and expendi-
ture; thus, other sources are also used.
13 These estimates do not consider whether consumers would cut back 
on these goods and services if they were taxed. Thus they consti-
tute partial equilibrium estimates about additional tax collection that 
would be obtained once exemptions are eliminated.
14 DEA analysis was first used by Farrell (1957). For a good introduction 
to the DEA methodology, see Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998) and Tha-
nassoulis (2001).
15 See Joumard, André, and Nic (2010).
16 This figure updates work by Afonso and Aubyn (2004). Data on the 
students per teacher ratio are for 2008, four years before students 
took their exam in 2012, corresponding to the prevailing secondary 
students per teacher ratio at the time primary students were finishing 
primary school and before they entered high school.
17 As such, savings computed here may not be that big because savings 
in terms of personnel may need to be partly offset by expenditures in 
training and other activities that could raise teacher productivity to 
the benchmark level.
18 Yet another potential source of inefficiency is an excessive number of 
administrative staff in public education. A similar approach could be 
used to obtain differences between current expenditure in adminis-
trative staff and efficient expenditure in administrative staff.
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19 Peru provides a good example for the region. It established a simple 
fiscal rule that combines deficit and current expenditure ceilings that 
created fiscal space to boost public investment. See Carranza, Daude, 
and Melguizo (2014).
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